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Chilling: The Constitutional
Implications of Body-Worn Cameras
and Facial Recognition Technology at
Public Protests
Julian R. Murphy*
Abstract
In recent years body-worn cameras have been championed by
community groups, scholars, and the courts as a potential check on
police misconduct. Such has been the enthusiasm for body-worn
cameras that, in a relatively short time, they have been rolled out to
police departments across the country. Perhaps because of the
optimism surrounding these devices there has been little
consideration of the Fourth Amendment issues they pose, especially
when they are coupled with facial recognition technology (FRT).
There is one particular context in which police use of FRT equipped
body-worn cameras is especially concerning: public protests. This
Comment constitutes the first scholarly treatment of this issue. Far
from a purely academic exercise, the police use of FRT equipped
body-worn cameras at public protests is sure to confront the courts
soon. Many police departments have, or will soon have, body-worn
cameras equipped with real time FRT and a number of police
departments do not prohibit their members from recording public
protests. Although primarily descriptive—exploring the state of
current Fourth Amendment doctrine by predicting its application
to a hypothetical scenario—this Comment has a normative subtext;
namely, suggesting that First Amendment values can strengthen
the Fourth Amendment’s protections against the tide of
technologically enhanced mass surveillance.
* Columbia Law School, Postgraduate Public Interest Fellow. BA (Hons);
LLB (Hons) (Melb); LLM (Columbia). I would like to thank Steven R. Shapiro for
his remarks on an earlier version of this Comment. Of course, all opinions and
errors are my own.

1

2

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (2018)
Table of Contents

I. Introduction .......................................................................................... 2
II. A Search or Not a Search? ................................................................... 7
A. The Type of Activity Engaged In ..................................................... 9
B. Duration of Surveillance ................................................................ 10
C. Technological Enhancement .......................................................... 11
D. General Public Use ........................................................................ 12
E. Efforts to Shield Information from Public View ............................ 14
F. Conclusion to Part II ...................................................................... 16
III. An Exception to the Warrant Requirement?.................................... 17
A. Exigent Circumstances .................................................................. 18
B. Special Needs ................................................................................. 19
C. Conclusion to Part III .................................................................... 22
IV. Reasonableness................................................................................. 22
A. The Specificity of the Threat.......................................................... 23
B. The Nature of the Privacy Intrusion
(Enter the First Amendment) ................................................................ 25
C. The Degree to Which the Search Advances the Government
Interest ................................................................................................... 27
D. Conclusion to Part IV..................................................................... 30
V. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 31

I. Introduction
August 12 has passed, and with it the first anniversary of the
events of Charlottesville, Virginia, which saw the death of Heather
Heyer and the emboldening of white supremacists across the
nation. Despite fears of a repeat, the streets of Charlottesville were
largely peaceful on August 12 this year. But things could have gone
differently.
Imagine that Jason Kessler and hundreds of his white
supremacist acolytes have gathered in Emancipation Park
(formerly Lee Park) to “celebrate” the events of one year earlier. A
large group of counter-protestors have assembled some distance
away to mark the anniversary of Heyer’s death and to decry the
continued mainstreaming of white supremacy. Both groups are
assembling consistently with the terms of permits they obtained
ahead of time from the local authorities. Unlike 2017, the local
police department is determined to maintain control of the
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proceedings and has established a cordon of police officers
separating the two groups. The police are dressed for the occasion
in full riot gear, including helmets, shields and canisters of tear
gas. In the hope of deterring potential troublemakers, the police
department heavily advertised its presence in advance and notified
the public that police officers would be recording the entire day on
body-worn cameras fitted with real time facial recognition
technology. The way such technology operates is that whenever an
individual exposes their face to the camera that individual is
instantly compared to a databank of images, identified and then
electronically tagged throughout the remainder of the footage,
even when their back is subsequently turned to the camera.
Knowing this, many protestors arrive at Emancipation Park
wearing paraphernalia, such as bandanas, intended to confound
the facial recognition technology.
Notwithstanding the police efforts, a violent altercation
breaks out between the opposing groups. Police ultimately regain
control of the situation and order everyone to disperse. As people
are leaving the park, police review their body-worn camera footage.
On the footage, one woman with a Black Lives Matter bandana
half covering her face can be seen punching Kessler. Although the
woman’s back was turned to the cameras for the duration of the
melee, she has been tagged by the facial recognition technology as
a result of having faced the cameras a few minutes earlier in the
footage. (The facial recognition technology was able to produce a
match despite half of the woman’s face being concealed by the
bandana.) The electronic tag includes not just a name but also a
residential address, which happens to be on a nearby street in
Charlottesville. Police central command dispatches a unit to stake
out the residence and, within an hour, the woman is arrested on
the pavement outside her front gate. The woman agrees that her
name is the same as that tagged by the technology but refuses to
answer further questions. Police are unable to obtain any
corroborating evidence so they decline to bring charges. (Kessler,
on the advice of his lawyers, refuses to cooperate with police.) The
woman subsequently brings a civil suit against the City of
Charlottesville, seeking damages for the violation of her
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.1
1.

There are admittedly a number of loose ends to this hypothetical. Is facial
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***
The body-worn camera “revolution,”2 as some scholars have
called it, grew out of events like the death of Michael Brown in
Ferguson and attendant public demands for increased police
transparency and accountability.3 Yet in the “moral panic”4 to
equip officers across the country with these devices, there has been
insufficient attention paid to the Fourth Amendment implications
of body-worn cameras, especially those fitted with facial
recognition technology (FRT). A number of scholars have
separately considered Fourth Amendment concerns relating to

recognition technology already so advanced that it can produce matches using
only a portion of a person’s face? How did police lawfully obtain the databank
image of the plaintiff against which to compare the body-worn camera footage?
These are interesting questions but not the focus of this Comment. Don’t fight the
hypothetical.
2. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera
Revolution, 50 U.C.D. L. REV. 897, 901 (2017).
3. See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy
Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 407–09 (2016) (describing the “police-worn body
camera revolution” in the wake of the events in Ferguson in 2014); Karson
Kampfe, Note, Police-Worn Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and Accountability
Through State and Police Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1154–55
(2015) (discussing the rapid uptick of body-worn cameras as a response to Michael
Brown’s death and other similar tragedies); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panic
and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 832 (2015) (stating that “one
significant policy suggestion has emerged from the [Ferguson] controversy:
equipping police officers with body cameras”); cf. Iesha S. Nunes, Note, “Hands
up, Don’t Shoot”: Police Misconduct and the Need for Body Cameras, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 1811, 1815–21 (2015) (describing pre-Ferguson incidents of police uses of
force against black civilians that arguably also contributed to the groundswell of
support for body-worn cameras).
4. Wasserman, supra note 3, at 832.
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body-worn cameras5 and FRT,6 but few have the examined the
unique constitutional considerations arising when these two
technologies are combined.7 Furthermore, no scholar has yet asked
the especially vexing questions presented by police use of FRT
equipped body-worn cameras at public protests. This is not a
purely academic exercise. Many police departments have, or will
soon have, body-worn cameras equipped with real time FRT,8 and,
5. See, e.g., Zachary R. Blaes, Note, Cop-arrazi: Why Body Cameras Are
Incompatible with the Fourth Amendment, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 15, 33 (2015)
(concluding that police body-worn cameras should be held to violate the Fourth
Amendment); Kelly Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy
Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
91, 121 (2015) (arguing that “it is unlikely that the courts will find the use of
body-mounted cameras to record individuals in public to be unconstitutional”);
Erik Nielsen, Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body
Cameras, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 141 (2016) (concluding that, under current
doctrine, there is no Fourth Amendment violation any time a body-worn camera
recording is made in a public place); Richard Shiller, Shooting in High Definition:
How Having Tough Policies in Place Makes the Use of Body Cameras in Law
Enforcement Comport with the Fourth Amendment, 51 NEW ENG. L. REV. 187, 195
(2016) (arguing that, with the right police department policies in place, police use
of body-worn cameras would not violate the Fourth Amendment).
6. See, e.g., Roberto Iraola, Lights, Camera, Action!—Surveillance
Cameras, Facial Recognition Systems and the Constitution, 49 LOY. L. REV. 773,
785–98 (2003) (concluding that “it is difficult to argue that the use of surveillance
cameras, even in conjunction with facial recognition systems, constitutes a search
when those cameras are directed at public places.”); Christopher S. Milligan,
Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L. J. 295, 318–20 (1999) (enumerating factors that courts would likely
take into account in assessing whether police may use FRT consistently with the
Fourth Amendment).
7. For authors who have adverted to this issue but not considered it in any
depth see Freund, supra note 5, at 104, 123 (concluding that there “are few
constitutional limits on the use of photographic database and FRT to scan faces
in public in real-time.”); CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE,
THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 4
(2016) (“If deployed pervasively on surveillance video or police-worn body
cameras, real-time face recognition will redefine the nature of public spaces.”);
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527,
614 (2017) (“[A] body camera with biometric recognition capabilities is a
significant technological enhancement . . . and could be far more susceptible to
abuse”).
8. See VIVIAN HUNG, STEVEN BABIN & JACQUELINE COBERLY, A MARKET
SURVEY ON BODY WORN CAMERA TECHNOLOGIES 410 (2016) (conducting market
survey of 38 body-worn camera manufacturers and concluding that at least nine
had FRT capabilities or were designed to be FRT capable in the future).
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in Virginia, few police departments prohibit their members from
recording public protests.9 This Comment aims to draw attention
to this urgent issue. Although primarily descriptive—exploring the
state of current Fourth Amendment doctrine by predicting its
application to the hypothetical fact pattern set out above—this
Comment has a normative subtext; namely, suggesting that First
Amendment values can revivify a strong version of the Fourth
Amendment that might then be transposed to situations with less
obvious political dimensions. In this respect, this Comment
contributes to the recent project of scholars like Thomas Crocker
and Jed Rubenfeld who seek to emphasize the political character
of the Fourth Amendment.10
The Comment will proceed in three parts. Part II asks the
question – as Fourth Amendment doctrine currently stands, would
police use of FRT equipped body-worn cameras at public protests
be characterized as a search? Part III proceeds to consider possible
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Part IV asks whether, if an
exception to the warrant requirement applied, the search would be
reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Throughout the
discussion, the Comment highlights the points at which First
Amendment concerns are likely to exert pressure on the Fourth
Amendment analysis. The ultimate aim of this Comment is to show
how, when we sharpen our Fourth Amendment analysis on the
edge of the First Amendment, we can envisage the Fourth
Amendment as a robust check on the tide of technologically
enhanced mass surveillance.

9. See FRANK KNAACK, GETTING TO WIN-WIN: THE USE OF BODY-WORN
CAMERAS IN VIRGINIA POLICING 3 (2015) (estimating that only 3% of Virginia police
departments prohibit their officers from recording public protests); see also
Brennan Centre for Justice, Police Body Camera Policies: Privacy and First
Amendment Protections, BRENNAN CENTRE FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 3, 2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/police-body-camera-policies-privacyand-first-amendment-protections (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (identifying a
number of police department across the country that require their officers to
record public protests) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 303 (2010); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008).
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II. A Search or Not a Search?
The Fourth Amendment relevantly protects “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable
search and seizures.”11 The “threshold question”12 in a case like the
present is whether the government has conducted a “search.”
Under current doctrine, a government action will be a search under
the Fourth Amendment if it satisfies either of two conditions: a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry;13 or a “common-law
trespassory test.”14 The Supreme Court has made clear that the
former test is appropriate in situations like ours that involve
“merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass.”15
There are two limbs to this test: “first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”16 The actual expectation limb has been exposed to
11.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text of the Fourth Amendment reads:

The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
space to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
12. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 59 (1992).
13. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test originated in Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967). It
subsequently became the orthodox approach. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Bond v. United States,
529 U.S. 334 (2000).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–13 (2012)
(articulating and applying the “common-law trespassory test” to find that the
government action in issue was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes). For
criticism of the supposed historical foundations of the trespassory test see Orin S.
Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67,
68 (2012) (stating that “no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz era. Neither the
original understanding nor Supreme Court doctrine equated searches with
trespass. Jones purports to revive a test that did not actually exist.”).
15. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411. See also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2213 (2018) (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to a case
involving the police collection of cell site location information).
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; cf. Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 148 (2016) (reframing the Katz
analysis: “in practice, the Katz test seems to ask the following: (1) Has the person
in question waived her privacy in her information by knowingly exposing it to the
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withering scholarly critique17 and is routinely ignored by the
courts.18 Accordingly, the remainder of Part II is dedicated to
discussing factors19 relevant to the other limb.

public? and (2) If not, then could the person have had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information?”).
17. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the
Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 344–45 (2002)
There is no good theoretical or practical reason for retaining the actual
expectation prerequisite. That inquiry has never been determinative
in a Supreme Court decision. That may be because any factor that
leads to the conclusion that an individual has not manifested a
subjective privacy expectation also supports the conclusion that society
is unprepared to deem an expectation reasonable. The inquiry is
superfluous or duplicative, at best. At worst, it has the potential to
mislead lower courts into denying legitimate Fourth Amendment
claims. Fourth Amendment threshold doctrine could only be improved
by elimination of the “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”
demand.
18. See Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 117–18 (2015) (examining cases from 2012
applying the Katz test and concluding that only 12% considered the subjective
limb).
19. For other authors’ lists of factors relevant to the “search” inquiry see
Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing
through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1393, 1406 (2001) [hereinafter Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms]
(1) the nature of the place to be observed; (2) the steps taken to enhance
privacy; (3) the degree to which the surveillance requires a physical
intrusion onto private property; (4) the nature of the object or activity
observed; (5) the extent to which the technology enhances the natural
senses; and (6) the extent to which the surveillance is unnecessarily
pervasive, invasive, or disruptive.
Slobogin also identifies a seventh factor, “the availability of the technology to the
general public”: see also Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical
Surveillance: The American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 383, 389–98 (1996) (describing the seven factors in more
depth); Levinson-Waldman, supra note 7, at 530
(1) the duration of the surveillance; (2) the lowering of structural
barriers to pervasive surveillance, reflected in the greatly reduced cost
of tracking; (3) the recording of an individual’s or group’s movements;
(4) the elicitation of information from within a protected space such as
a home; and, as appropriate, (5) whether the technology undermines
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A. The Type of Activity Engaged In
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it has been written that
“certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from
government invasion.”20 The paradigm example is the special
Fourth Amendment sanctity afforded to the home,21 because it
“provide[s] the setting for those intimate activities that the
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference
or surveillance.”22 However, remembering that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,”23 it is clear that the areas
deserving scrupulous Fourth Amendment protection are not solely
to be conceived of in physical terms; they can also include
categories of activity or conduct.
Crocker has made a convincing case for the Fourth
Amendment to be read in a manner that is at least partially
activity-orientated rather than purely location-focused.24 More
specifically, Crocker relies on the First Amendment’s guarantee of
a “right of the people” to frame the provision as an essentially
political right that coheres with the First Amendment’s
protections.25 Rubenfeld too emphasizes the words “the people” in
the Fourth Amendment in contrast to the other individual-focused

core constitutional rights and (6) whether surveillance technologies are
piggy-backed on each other.
20. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At [the
Fourth Amendment’s] very core stands the right of a man to retreat to his home
and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.”).
22. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
24. See generally Crocker, supra note 10; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 10
(arguing, to similar effect, for a conception of the Fourth Amendment that is
orientated to “security” rather than “privacy”); cf. Thomas K. Clancy, The
Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J.
979 (2011) (adopting an originalist analysis focused on the Fourth Amendment’s
place in criminal procedure rather than its political valence).
25. Crocker, supra note 10, at 311 (“Fourth Amendment liberty protects
public associations [and] private life . . . [and] allows us to see how rights against
search and seizure coordinate with rights to speak and assemble.” Id. at 312
“[T]extual placement of protecting ‘a right of the people’ indicates a political
purpose better suited to protecting liberty than privacy alone.”).
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criminal procedure guarantees in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.26
Crocker and Rubenfeld’s structural and textual arguments are
supported by an understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s origins
in seditious libel cases. As is now widely accepted, the Fourth
Amendment grew out of Founding-era admiration for a number of
British cases—those of John Entick27 and John Wilkes28 being the
most renowned—limiting the power of the State to seize the papers
and effects of political opponents. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged the essentially public and political concerns
motivating the Fourth Amendment, observing: “It is true that the
struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged ‘is largely a
history of conflict between the Crown and the press.’”29 What flows
from this historically grounded understanding of the Fourth
Amendment’s political dimension? In an analogous context, the
Supreme Court has said: “history indispensably teaches” that
certain Fourth Amendment requirements must be applied with
“scrupulous exactitude” when First Amendment freedoms are
implicated.30 The same ought to be true in the present instance. In
order to fully effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s political
protections, a court confronted with our hypothetical fact pattern
ought to scrupulously apply the Fourth Amendment’s search
criteria to the impugned government action.
B. Duration of Surveillance
The duration of government surveillance is well recognized to
be relevant in determining whether the government has infringed

26. Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 120.
27. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P.) 1031.
28. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153 (C.P.) 1167.
29. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965)); see also United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496,
498 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing the “historical background of the [Fourth]
Amendment, with its stress on the seizure of books and papers on political
affairs”).
30. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (describing heightened
warrant particularity requirements relating to searches and seizures of a citizen’s
political books).
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a reasonable expectation of privacy.31 In our present factual
scenario the surveillance would have lasted no more than a few
hours. While some authors have suggested that this may exceed
the constitutional limit,32 it is likely that duration would be a factor
weighing against categorization of the police conduct as a “search.”
C. Technological Enhancement
Where state surveillance entails the use of technology, the
courts will consider the degree to which the technology enhances
human information gathering capabilities.33 Alternately put, the
courts will ask: “does the technology allow law enforcement to
achieve an objective that would normally be circumscribed by the
Fourth Amendment?”34 This concern is typically discussed in the
context of cameras capable of zoom or magnification,35 but
31. See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855, 873 (E.D. Tenn.
2013) (holding that ten-week surveillance of a defendant’s private residence
transgresses a reasonable expectation of privacy: “ten weeks crosses into the
unreasonable, provoking an ‘immediate negative visceral reaction’ suggestive of
the Orwellian state”).
32. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 128 (2007) (suggesting
that, for suspicionless individualized surveillance, the constitutional limit might
be “a minute or so”).
33. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 629–62 (5th ed. 2012) (identifying that a primary consideration in
the “search” stage of the court’s inquiry is “the level of sophistication of the
equipment utilized by the police”).
34. John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of
Facial Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 84 (2002).
35. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public
Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L.
REV. 21, 31 (2013) (“Police can use telescopes or extremely powerful zoom lenses
to scrutinize details on a person’s clothing, or on items or documents removed
from a wallet or briefcase, that would be invisible to bystanders just a few yards
away”); Freund, supra note 5, at 120 (suggesting that “magnification” capabilities
are relevant to the “search” inquiry); cf. Christopher Slobogin, Community
Control over Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett Capers’s Crime,
Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 994 (2013) (arguing
that the Supreme Court has regularly concluded that camera surveillance does
not constitute a search “even when, in fact, members of the general public are . .
. not likely to possess magnification devices of the type the police possessed”). For
an example of a case in which technological magnification did not result in the
attachment of the “search” label see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 239 (1986) (holding that aerial surveillance using a specialized mapping
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assumed special importance in the Supreme Court’s consideration
of a more novel technology—thermal imaging—in Kyllo v. United
States.36 In that case, police used a thermal imaging camera to
detect heat emanating from inside a suspect’s house. Finding that
such action constituted a search, the Court remarked: “obtaining
by sense-enhancing technology any information . . . that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area constitutes a search.”37 In Kyllo it
was clear that, using only their natural senses, the police would
have had to enter the house to obtain the same information they
were able to obtain from outside with the benefit of thermal
imaging technology.
As applied to our imagined lawsuit, this factor suggests that
the Charlottesville police’s actions ought to be described as a
“search”. Given that the plaintiff was wearing a bandana
concealing half of her face, it would not have been possible for
police to identify her with the naked eye. The only way police could
conceivably have identified the plaintiff without the aid of
technology would have been to physically remove her bandana,
which of course they could not do without “physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area.” This consideration thus falls on
the plaintiff’s side of the ledger, although one scholar has
suggested that this factor is rarely determinative.38
D. General Public Use
Where a government action makes use of sense-enhancing
technology, the extent to which that technology is in general public
use will be a relevant factor in considering the reasonableness of a
civilian’s expectation of privacy. For example, in Kyllo, the Court
remarked on the fact that “the [thermal imaging] technology in

camera was not a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
36. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
37. Id. at 34–35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
38. Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 23 (2006) (“[T]he use of devices by law
enforcement to enhance sight . . . [has] rarely changed the Court’s conclusion that
no search occurred.”).

CHILLING: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

13

question is not in general public use.”39 Many commentators worry
that the “general public use” consideration creates a one-way
ratchet reducing constitutional protections as technology
inevitably advances in capability, affordability and availability.40
For the moment, however, this factor remains one that courts take
into account.
As applied to our hypothetical lawsuit, the City could quite
reasonably claim that—given the widespread public use of camera
phones at protests, including Charlottesville 2017—people
attending such events can no longer claim a reasonable expectation
that they will not be filmed. The police use of FRT, however,
complicates things. It is true that rudimentary forms of FRT have
been available to the public for over a decade,41 and that quite
advanced forms of FRT may soon be available on smart phones.42
Importantly, however, public users of FRT do not have access to
the government’s expansive databanks of comparison images.43
(Such databanks are now reported to contain images of
approximately half of the nation’s adult population.44) Without a
meaningfully large databank there is little utility to FRT.45
39. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
40. See, e.g., Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms, supra note 19, at 1437; Quin
M. Sorenson, Losing a Plain View of Katz: The Loss of a Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy under the Readily Available Standard Comment, 107 DICK. L. REV. 179,
195 (2002).
41. Iraola, supra note 6, at 796 n.115 (describing FRT available to the
general public in the early 2000s).
42. Jake Laperruque, Apple’s FaceID Could Be a Powerful Tool for Mass
Spying, WIRED, (Sept. 14, 2017 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/applesfaceid-could-be-a-powerful-tool-for-mass-spying/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2018)
(stating that Apple’s FaceID tool will use FRT to identify individuals and unlock
their phones) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. This may soon change, see Jay Stanley, A Looming Implication of Face
Recognition: Private Photo Blacklists, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION: FREE FUTURE
(Apr.
16,
2018,
2:30
PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/looming-implication-face-recognitionprivate-photo (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (detailing the rise of “private photo
blacklists”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. GARVIE, BEDOYA & FRANKLE, supra note 7 (“One in two American adults
is in a law enforcement face recognition network.”).
45. Brogan, supra note 35, at 84
Although the individual elements of facial scanning technology are
widely available: cameras, recognition software, and databases, the
power of a scanning system is its breadth: the dizzying quantity of
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Accordingly, a proper understanding of the City’s use of FRT
reveals that such capabilities are not in use by the general public.
This consideration should thus support a finding that a Fourth
Amendment “search” has occurred.
E. Efforts to Shield Information from Public View
In assessing whether to endorse as reasonable a particular
expectation of privacy the courts generally take the view that a
person’s actions in public do not attract a reasonable expectation
of privacy. (This is not to be confused with the “plain view”
exception to the warrant requirement.46) The rationale is that a
person cannot expect privacy in information that they have
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who would care to look.47 There
are, however, limits to this rationale, especially when a person has
made efforts to shield their information from public view. Thus in
Katz v. United States—a case where the FBI bugged a public phone
box—it was significant that Mr. Katz had closed the phone box
door, in what was understood to be an effort to shield his
conversation from other members of the public. Justice Harlan
explained: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks

interlinked cameras and baseline databases. To that extent, facial
scanning systems are in no more common use by the general public
than was the thermal sensing technology used in Kyllo. (citation
omitted).
46.

See LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 599

[T]he concern here is with plain view in quite a different sense, namely,
as descriptive of a situation in which there has been no Fourth
Amendment search at all. This situation, which perhaps is deserving
of a different label so as to avoid confusion . . . encompasses those
circumstances in which an observation is made by a police officer
without a prior physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (explaining
that a person driving on public roads can have no reasonable expectation in the
privacy of their movements).
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to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.”48
This principle coheres with the “container doctrine”, which
recognizes a reasonable privacy interest in the contents of a sealed
container, even where that container is in a public place. Under
this doctrine, “a traveller who carries a toothbrush and a few
articles of clothing in a . . . knotted scarf [may] claim an equal
right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the
sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case.”49 As
analogized to the present hypothetical, one might think of the
plaintiff’s bandana as equivalent to the closed phone box door or
the knotted scarf.50 The plaintiff’s efforts to shield her identifying
information—namely, her face—from public view should
distinguish her case from earlier biometric data cases in which the
courts refused to recognize a Fourth Amendment search.51
Accordingly, this factor supports the plaintiff’s claim of a
reasonable expectation that her identity would remain private at
the Charlottesville protest.

48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); cf. United States v.
Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d 933, 938–39 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (the fact that no efforts had
been made to “shield the property from public view” counted against the
reasonableness of any expectation of privacy). See also Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“A person does not surrender all Fourth
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”).
49. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).
50. On the dangers of analogical reasoning in Fourth Amendment cases
involving new technologies see Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475,
477 (2011) (“In rejecting Fourth Amendment claims involving warrantless use of
sophisticated technologies, courts often rely upon analogies to prior ‘search’ cases,
but these supposed analogies are so far removed from the new forms of
surveillance that analogies to them only confuse, rather than clarify, the actual
analysis required by Katz.”).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1972)
The physical characteristics of a person’s voice, its tone and manner,
as opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly
exposed to the public. Like a man’s facial characteristics, or
handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No
person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the
sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his
face will be a mystery to the world.
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F. Conclusion to Part II

In concluding our discussion of the indicia of a search under
the Fourth Amendment it is worth adverting to some broader,
overarching policy considerations likely to play out in any court’s
analysis of the “search” issue. Any determination of whether or not
a practice is a search is, after all, “a value judgment.”52 Some
judges would likely look to find that no search occurred in this case,
because such a finding would avoid involving the courts in the
inevitably messy task of adjudging the “reasonable” use of rapidly
developing technology.53 Conversely, other judges might worry
about concluding that no search has taken place because to do so
would effectively immunize this powerful new technology from any
judicial oversight.54 This anxiety would be compounded by worries
that the technology might “chill” First Amendment expression and
association (this will be discussed in Part IV.B.). It is unlikely that
any “chill” could be addressed by way of a direct First Amendment
challenge,55 because of the unhelpful standing jurisprudence that
52. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974) (describing the “search” question as a “value
judgment” as to “whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the
police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of
privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass
inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society”).
53. This cautious, non-interventionist approach is also recommended by
some scholars. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV.
801, 805 (2003)
[C]ourts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution
when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures
to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations
involving new technologies. . . . When technology is in flux, Fourth
Amendment protections should remain relatively modest until the
technology stabilizes.
54. Tomkovicz, supra note 17, at 325 (“The significance of the threshold issue
is hard to understate. If the employment of a new investigatory tool is not a search
at all, it is outside the sphere of Fourth Amendment regulation, and government
authorities are at liberty to use it whenever they wish, without need for prior
justification.”).
55. Cf. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 151 (2007) (advocating for First Amendment remedies against
government information gathering: “[T]he First Amendment should serve as an
independent source of procedure to protect expressive and associational activity
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governs claims of “chilled” speech.56 Accordingly, it may be that
First Amendment concerns guide the court to a Fourth
Amendment result, namely a finding that the conduct is a “search”
and thus susceptible to judicial oversight.57
III. An Exception to the Warrant Requirement?
“To say that the Fourth Amendment applies here is the
beginning point, not the end of the analysis.”58 Assuming, for
argument’s sake, that the City’s use of FRT equipped body-worn
cameras is found to be a search for Fourth Amendment purposes,
what then? Given that no warrant was obtained, the search would
be considered “per se unreasonable”59 unless it could be brought
within an exception60 to the warrant requirement.61 Many of the
from government information gathering.”).
56. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (considering government
practice of monitoring the political activities of anti-war activists, the Court held
that the “subjective chill” on the protestors’ First Amendment rights did not
satisfy standing requirements of objective harm or threat of specific future harm);
Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2004) (finding Fourth Amendment, but not First Amendment,
standing of individual plaintiff to challenge bag searches at public protests); cf.
Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1316–25 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that the
local authority’s proposal to subject political demonstrators to a metal detector
search violated the First Amendment).
57. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 651
To say that a particular type of police practice is not a search is to
conclude, in effect, that such activities [are outside of the court’s
regulation] . . . thus the push must be in the direction of applying the
“search” appellation to those varieties of police conduct we are not
prepared to leave totally uncontrolled.
58. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 1969 (2013).
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
60. Half a century ago it was said that exceptions to the warrant
requirement are “jealously and carefully drawn.” Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 499 (1958). It is now closer to the truth that the warrant requirement is “so
riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable.” California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991). See also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,
2482 (2014) (stating that “the label ‘exception’ is something of a misnomer in this
context, as warrantless searches incident to arrest occur with far greater
frequency than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”).
61. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (“In the absence of a warrant, a search is
reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant
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recognized exceptions—such as consent62 and “plain view”63—are
inapplicable to the present facts, but there are at least two
exceptions that might arguably be engaged.
A. Exigent Circumstances
The Court has recognized that, in certain circumstances, “‘the
exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”64 There are a number of common
fact patterns under this doctrine, including: pursuit of a fleeing
suspect,65 prevention of imminent evidence destruction,66 and
searches of premises where the occupant is seriously injured or

requirement.”).
62. One could imagine the City arguing that the plaintiff consented to being
filmed with FRT equipped body-worn cameras by attending the protest. This
would be a difficult argument for the City to maintain absent proof that the
plaintiff had actually been aware of the advance police notifications regarding the
use of FRT at the protest. Even if the City could establish knowledge on the part
of the plaintiff this should not necessarily be equated with consent, especially
given her attempts to conceal her face with a bandana. As a general rule, consent
is an inapposite warrant exception to apply to mass surveillance techniques. See
SLOBOGIN, supra note 32, at 127 (“[T]he notion that people consent to public
surveillance simply because they proceed with their business after having been
notified that cameras are present is disingenuous at best. Consent implies that
realistic alternatives exist.”); see also Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why
Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 846, 905–06 (2010) (arguing
that “implied consent” in this context should be deemed an “unconstitutional
constraint”); Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) (describing
the requirement to submit to a search in order to engage in First Amendment
expression as “an especially malignant unconstitutional condition”); cf. Johnston
v. Tampa Sports Authority, 530 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that a
visitor to a sports stadium impliedly consented to a pat-down search that was
conducted on all patrons).
63. Properly understood, the “plain view” exception to the warrant
requirement applies in circumstances where police incidentally observe or seize
evidence in the course of an otherwise lawful search or seizure. The plain view
exception to the warrant requirement has no application in circumstances such
as the present where the initial search or seizure is what is subject to
constitutional challenge. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 599.
64. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
65. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967).
66. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
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threatened with such injury.67 Importantly, the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is only
properly engaged when there is a specific threat (often amounting
to probable cause68) that would make obtaining a warrant
impractical.69
At first blush this exception might look attractive to the City.
The argument would be that, as the violence at Emancipation Park
subsided, police reviewed the body-worn camera footage out of fear
of further violence. Alternately, the City might try to analogize the
present facts to a “hot pursuit” situation. A close reading of our
plaintiff’s case reveals that these arguments are foreclosed by the
chronology of events. The search at issue here began at the
moment that the police body-worn camera recorded the plaintiff’s
face and matched that face to an identity (the search did not begin
only when police look at the body-worn camera footage). This was
before any risk of violence and certainly before any attempted
police pursuit. The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement does not apply to the sort of precautionary or
prophylactic search at issue here.
B. Special Needs
Arguably more appropriate would be the “special needs”
exception—an outgrowth of the “administrative search”
exception70—so often invoked by police to justify terrorism related
dragnet searches.71 Developed in the face of a perceived uptick in
domestic terrorism in the late 1960s,72 the special needs exception
67. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006).
68. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 308 (asserting that a warrantless search
of personal effects requires probable cause).
69. King, 563 U.S. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Circumstances qualify
as ‘exigent’ when there is an imminent risk of death or serious injury, or danger
that evidence will immediately be destroyed, or that a suspect will escape.”).
70. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2004)
(describing “special needs” searches and “administrative” searches as distinct
exceptions to the warrant requirement but noting that they are “not necessarily
mutually exclusive”).
71. See Simmons, supra note 62, at 850–86 (reviewing case law and tracing
the origins and development of the special needs doctrine through a slew of
terrorism cases).
72. See id. at 850–59 (describing how the “administrative search” doctrine
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to the warrant requirement was designed to apply to “those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable.”73 The central requirement of
the special needs doctrine is that the government’s “direct”,
“primary” or “immediate” purpose74 must be something other than
a “general interest in crime control,”75 “the normal need for law
enforcement”76 or “crime detection.”77 The distinction between a
special need and a general interest in crime control has, at times,
proved elusive.78
Outside of the anti-terrorism context, the Supreme Court has
relied on the special needs doctrine to uphold suspicionless
sobriety checkpoints to protect the public from the dangers of
drunk driving.79 Yet, a decade later, the Court refused to endorse
suspicionless vehicle checkpoints for drug searches, explaining
that the checkpoints were designed to “detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing”80 and this went no further than a “general
interest in crime control.”81 While the special needs cases have
been described to be in “a state of disarray,”82 the Court appears to
have drawn a distinction between prophylactic protection against
crime and after-the-fact detection of crime; only the former will be
capable of amounting to a special need.

was developed in response to more aggressive government surveillance practices
after domestic terrorism incidents in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
73. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting Justice
Blackmun’s concurrence in the aforementioned case).
74. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001).
75. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979).
76. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351.
77. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
78. See, e.g., Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2004)
(suggesting that protecting the public and enforcing the law are “inextricably
intertwined”).
79. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
80. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000); see also Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (explaining that “crime detection” alone cannot
constitute a special need).
81. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
82. Simmons, supra note 62, at 887.
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A number of lower courts have convincingly articulated the
dangers of carving out a special needs warrant exception for
anti-terrorist policing,83 however just such an exception appears to
have emerged. In MacWade v. Kelly,84 the Second Circuit upheld
the practice of random searches in the New York City subway
system to meet the special need of “preventing a terrorist attack.”85
That same year a differently constituted Second Circuit wrote: “It
is clear to the Court that the prevention of terrorist attacks on
large vessels engaged in mass transportation . . . constitutes a
‘special need.’”86 In the air travel context, the special need of
protecting against terrorist attacks has been widely accepted for
decades.87
In our case, the City would likely argue that they were acting
in furtherance of a special need to protect against domestic
terrorism of the sort that occurred in Charlottesville in 2017.
Attorney General Jeff Sessions and some national security
scholars appear to agree that the events of Charlottesville 2017
may properly be labelled “domestic terrorism.”88 Given the burden
83.

See Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1311

While the threat of terrorism is omnipresent, we cannot use it as the
basis for restricting the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections
in any large gathering of people. In the absence of some reason to
believe that international terrorists would target or infiltrate this
protest, there is no basis for using September 11 as an excuse for
searching protestors.
see also Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2015)
(cautioning that courts remain “vigilant in protecting constitutional rights” even
when faced with claimed threats of terrorism); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court
of the E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (prohibiting the federal government
from warrantless surveillance of people who were alleged to be domestic
terrorists).
84

460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006).

85. Id. at 263.
86. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 82 (2d Cir. 2006).
87. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 326–57 (reviewing airport search case law
from the late 1960s until today).
88. See Charlie Savage & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions Emerges as Forceful
Figure in Condemning Charlottesville Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/politics/domestic-terrorismsessions.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (reporting on Session’s description of
Charlottesville 2017 as “domestic terrorism”) (on file with the Wasington and Lee
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of the case law, the need to protect against a repeat of such events
would probably satisfy the description of a “special need”.
C. Conclusion to Part III
If, as I have predicted, the City’s actions in Charlottesville fall
within the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement
that would not end the inquiry. The description of a particular
factual situation as an “exception” is somewhat deceptive because
the “ultimate touchstone”89 of the Fourth Amendment is
“reasonableness.” Finding an “exception” applicable is best
understood to return the court to an open textured
“reasonableness” inquiry.90 As was explained in an early special
needs case, “the legality of a [special needs] search . . . should
depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances,
of the search.”91
IV. Reasonableness
The Supreme Court has said that “where a Fourth
Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs . . . it is
necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against
the Government’s interests.”92 In what follows, I identify a number

Law Review); Mary B. McCord, Criminal Law Should Treat Domestic Terrorism
as the Moral Equivalent of International Terrorism, LAWFARE (Aug. 21, 2017, 1:59
PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/criminal-law-should-treat-domestic-terrorismmoral-equivalent-international-terrorism (last visited Aug. 10, 2018)
(characterizing the events of Charlottesville 2017 as domestic terrorism) (on file
with theWashington and Lee Law Review).
89. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
90. See Simmons, supra note 62, at 895 (“all of the current suspicionless
antiterrorism cases—after applying the special needs test to bypass the general
requirement of a warrant and probable cause—essentially apply a reasonableness
analysis.”); see, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (explaining that
a search falling within an exception to the warrant requirement must still satisfy
a reasonableness inquiry: “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness”).
91. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
92. Von Raab v. United States, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989).
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of factors93 that would feature in the “balancing analysis”94 in our
plaintiff’s case.
A. The Specificity of the Threat
When the government interest is identified as “deterring
highly hazardous conduct” like terrorism, the courts will generally
give great weight to that interest in the “reasonableness” inquiry.95
The greater the danger posed to public safety, the more likely a
court is to find the search reasonable.96 It remains unclear,
however, what degree of specificity of threat is required to
reasonably justify suspicionless searches. At one end of the
continuum, it is relatively settled that a search of political
protestors will not be found to be reasonable purely on the basis of
an “omnipresent” threat of terrorist attacks at large public
gatherings.97 Similarly, courts will be reluctant to uphold searches
93. For other taxonomies of relevant factors see Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1120–25 (1998)
(discussing factors relevant to determining whether a search is reasonable,
including: the intrusiveness of the search; the importance of the governmental
interest; and the identity of the person being searched); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471
F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2006) (listing the balancing factors as “(1) the nature of the
privacy interest involved; (2) the character and degree of the governmental
intrusion; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the government’s needs, and the
efficacy of its policy in addressing those needs.”); MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260,
268–69 (2d Cir. 2006)
[T]he court determines whether the search is reasonable by balancing
several competing considerations. These balancing factors include
(1) the weight and immediacy of the government interest; (2) “the
nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by” the search;
(3) “the character of the intrusion imposed by” the search; and (4) the
efficacy of the search in advancing the government interest. (citations
omitted).
94. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990).
95. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (discussing suspicionless searches
conducted at airports).
96. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449–52 (upholding the constitutionality of
suspicionless sobriety tests of drivers and noting the grave danger posed by drunk
drivers to public safety).
97. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding
that a proposal to subject all protestors to a metal detector search was
unreasonable).
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of political protestors based on “overly vague” evidence or a
“general invocation of terrorism threats.”98 Instead, what these
more demanding cases require is a “fixed and distinct” threat,
rather than one that is “indefinite or generalized.”99 Relevant to a
court’s inquiry will be whether there is a “history of injury or
violence” in relation to the specific event or events like it.100
As against these cases there is dicta from the Supreme Court
to the effect that “where the risk to public safety is substantial and
real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may
rank as ‘reasonable.’”101 Lower courts have noted that
suspicionless searches at airports occur absent any evidence of
specific threat and, accordingly, have upheld suspicionless
searches on public transportation.102 In so doing, one court
explained that a search will be held to be reasonable where there
is a generalized but “high risk” of terrorism associated with the
particular services or activity targeted—in that case, “mass
transportation”.103 The Second Circuit has further explained,
quoting from the Supreme Court: “All that is required is that the
‘risk to public safety [be] substantial and real’ instead of merely
‘symbolic.’”104 In the present case, the 2017 acts of violence at
Charlottesville would likely provide sufficiently specific evidence
of a threat of repeated domestic terrorist activity. The court would
98. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870,
at *84–85 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2004).
99. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1663600,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 27, 2004).
100. State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702, 708 (N.D. 2005) (finding that a program
of searching all attendees to a sports stadium violated the Fourth Amendment).
101. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (emphasis added), quoted in
MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2006).
102 See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Massachusetts
Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652-GAO, 2004 WL 1682859 (D Mass. July 28, 2004)
(upholding suspicionless searches of bus and train passengers around the 2004
Democratic National Convention); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006)
(upholding suspicionless searches of passengers on a ferry).
103 Cassidy, 471 F.3d at 82, 83–84 (observing “the government has a ‘special
need’ to prevent [terrorist attacks] from developing, and courts have readily
acknowledged the special government need in protecting citizens in the mass
transportation context” and explaining, further, that “the airline cases make it
clear that the government, in its attempt to counteract the threat of terrorism,
need not show that every ferry terminal is threatened by terrorism”).
104 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272 (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322-23).
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B. The Nature of the Privacy Intrusion (Enter the First
Amendment)
As against the government interest in protecting against
terrorist attacks the court would have to weigh the plaintiff’s
privacy interest.105 It is at this point that First Amendment values
would likely enter the analysis.106 The Supreme Court has
instructed: “in . . . determining the reasonableness of a search,
state and federal magistrates should be aware that ‘unrestricted
power of search and seizure could also be used as an instrument
for stifling liberty of expression.’”107 In this spirit, the plaintiff
would likely argue that the potential “chill” to First Amendment
expressive activities and associations should count against a
finding that the police conduct was reasonable.108 The concern here
105

Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42–43 (2000)

[T]he gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue
a given purpose. Rather . . . in determining whether individualized
suspicion is required, we must consider the nature of the interests
threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement
practices at issue.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[W]e generally determine
whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
106 See Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330, 1339 (2d Cir. 1987) (examining
the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of weapons searches at Ku Klux Klan
rallies and accepting that First Amendment jurisprudence was relevant to the
analysis); Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL
1593870, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2004) (analyzing the reasonableness of bag
searches at a public protest and taking into account the “danger of discouraging
constitutionally protected expression” and the danger of attaching “stigma” to the
persons searched); Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004
WL 1663600, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004) (“A . . . search in the context of the
exercise of constitutionally protected speech calls for a different analysis.”).
107 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 727 (1961)).
108 See Freund, supra note 5, at 106 (articulating concern that
“body-mounted cameras would chill political and other types of speech.”);
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is not with body-worn camera surveillance per se, which would
likely only have a minor “chilling” effect,109 but with the use of FRT
in combination with body-worn cameras.
This argument proceeds from an understanding that certain
people only engage in expressive action or association, especially
unpopular action or association,110 when they believe that they can
remain anonymous in doing so.111 To strip such people of their
anonymity, the argument goes, would have the effect of
discouraging the sort of speech and association at the heart of the
First Amendment.112 Paradoxically, the fact that the City gave
advance notice of the proposed use of FRT—a factor which usually
minimizes privacy intrusion113—could have heightened the
chilling effect as it may have deterred people from attending the
protest at all. Effects aside, any evidence of intent on the part of

SLOBOGIN, supra note 32, at 99 (“[I]f public conduct is expressive—for instance, a
speech at a park rally—and public associations are speech related—such as
joining the rally—then the First Amendment should be implicated by camera
surveillance. That is because . . . such surveillance can chill conduct.”).
109 See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 7, at 612 (noting that, “ironically”,
the chilling effect of body-worn cameras may “be mitigated in some degree by the
fact that the presence of police officers always imposes some chilling effect; the
addition of a body camera adds to that chill, but perhaps not as much as long-term
surveillance”).
110 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (striking down a
prohibition on anonymous handbills, the Court noted: “Persecuted groups and
sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive
practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”).
111 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182,
197–98 (1999) (referring to evidence presented to the District Court establishing
that compelling petition circulators to wear name badges inhibited participation,
especially relating to “volatile” political issues).
112 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
(striking down, as violating the First Amendment, an Ohio Code provision that
prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (finding that the state of Alabama could not,
consistently with the First Amendment, compel the NAACP to disclose its
membership lists); see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 32, at 101 (“People who engage
in expressive conduct in public know they will be observed. But they may
choose . . . not to reveal their identity, for all sorts of reasons. Camera
surveillance virtually nullifies that effort.”).
113 See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 463 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.) (“There is a
critical difference between a seizure that is preceded by fair notice and one that
is effected by surprise.”).
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the City to discourage the protest entirely would almost certainly
be fatal to a “reasonableness” finding.114
One final, but important, consideration is that the FRT used
here operated in real time, not retrospectively. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc. suggests that after-the-fact government
identification of political actors is not as grave a concern as
identification of actors in the “precise moment” of the First
Amendment event.115 On this reasoning, a police department
might be permitted to record protestors and to subject that footage
to FRT after the protest ended, but would not be permitted to film
protestors using real time FRT. Accordingly, this factor tends
against a reasonableness finding in our hypothetical.
C. The Degree to Which the Search Advances the Government
Interest
Where a warrant exception applies and the court reverts to a
generalized reasonableness analysis, it will interrogate the degree
to which the search advances the government interest.116 In our
case, two considerations present as relevant: first, the extent to
which body-worn cameras served to protect against the identified

114 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (explaining that,
contrary to most other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
government’s subjective purpose is a relevant factor when considering the
reasonableness of special needs or administrative searches).
115 See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199–200 (holding that compelling a petition
circulator to wear a name badge while petitioning infringed First Amendment
rights, but requiring that same petitioner to disclose their name in an affidavit
afterwards did not). The Court reasoned: “The injury to speech is heightened for
the petition circulator because the badge requirement compels personal name
identification at the precise moment when the circulator’s interest in anonymity
is greatest. . . . In contrast, the affidavit requirement [is permissible].” Id.
116 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[W]e generally
determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant
requirement ‘by assessing . . . the degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate government interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 300 (1999)); see also Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455
(1990) (taking into account, as one factor in the balancing analysis, “the extent to
which this [search] can reasonably be said to advance that [government]
interest”).
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threat; and, secondly, the extent to which the police use of bodyworn cameras was limited to achieve its purpose.117
On the first of these issues, the case law requires that the
government search be a “sufficiently productive mechanism to
justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests.”118 This
does not require the government to show that the search is the
most productive means of achieving its interest,119 however the
government’s case will be assisted by at least some empirical
data120 showing “how the searches will reduce the threat.”121 In our
case, as in the challenge to passenger searches on the New York
City subway, the City would likely argue that the search would
deter terrorist activity.122 More specifically, the City would argue
that the advertised123 presence of FRT equipped cameras would
cause any rational person to think twice before engaging in
violence. This reliance on what some have called the “civilizing
effect”124 of body-worn cameras is not entirely supported by the
empirical data. A recent study of body-worn cameras in
Washington, D.C. showed that civilians interacting with police
officers wearing body-worn cameras were more likely to assault the
officers than civilians who were interacting with camera-free

117 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (explaining that an
administrative or special needs search must be “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place” (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
118 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (emphasis added).
119 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453–54 (“[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis,
the choice among reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials
who have a unique understanding of, and responsibility for, limited public
resources, including a finite number of police officers.”).
120 See id. at 454 (suggesting that the absence of empirical data was fatal to
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of the police conduct in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)).
121 Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870,
at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2004).
122 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 274 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the City’s
“deterrent effect” argument and the expert evidence led in support of it).
123 See Commonwealth v. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d 317, 322–23 (Mass. 2004)
(noting that the suspicionless search at issue in that case was not preceded by
advance public notice, and that this was a fact counting against the State).
124 Justin T. Ready & Jacob T. N. Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video
Cameras on Police–Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in
Mesa, AZ, 11 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 445, 446 (2015).
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officers.125 Nevertheless, courts deciding these questions have
exhibited reluctance to “peruse, parse, or extrapolate” empirical
data, and instead tend to defer to government experts and elected
officials.126 Accordingly, considered “at the level of design,”127 a
court is likely to accept the plausibility of the City’s argument that
FRT cameras would deter potential violence at the Charlottesville
2018 protests.
On the second question—relating to the extent to which the
search was limited to achieving its purpose—the government need
not show that the search was “the least restrictive means” of
achieving its objective,128 but there must be a “close fit” between
the scope of the search and the objective.129 In order to answer this
question in the context of our hypothetical, a court would need to
look into the City’s body-worn camera policies relating to
activation, data retention, storage and publication. It is likely that
any court would be reluctant to give Fourth Amendment
imprimatur to a body-worn camera policy that appears
overexpansive and without sufficient safeguards relating to
individualized data.130 Slobogin has argued, in the context of
125 DAVID YOKUM, ANITA RAVISHANKAR & ALEXANDER COPPOCK , EVALUATING
EFFECTS OF POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL
(2017).
126 See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 274
THE

We will not peruse, parse, or extrapolate four months’ worth of data in
an attempt to divine how many checkpoints the City ought to deploy in
the exercise of its day-to-day police power. Counter-terrorism experts
and politically accountable officials have undertaken the delicate and
esoteric task of deciding how best to marshal their available resources
in light of the conditions prevailing on any given day. We will not—and
may not—second-guess the minutiae of their considered decisions.
127 Id. at 274.
128 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002), quoted in MacWade, 460
F.3d at 273.
129 Ruskai v. Pistole, 775 F.3d 61, 69 (1st Cir. 2014) (“While we will not
require the government to adopt the least intrusive practicable alternative, there
must be a fairly close fit between the weight of the government’s interest in
searching and the intrusiveness of the search.”).
130
Consider Justice Ginsburg’s concerns about the integrity of information
on police databases. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (“Electronic databases form the nervous system of contemporary
criminal justice operations. In recent years, their breadth and influence have
dramatically expanded. . . . The risk of error stemming from these databases is
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CCTV, that strict policies regulating storage and publication of
body-worn camera footage would help bring a particular recording
within the range permitted by the Fourth Amendment.131 In fact,
Slobogin has conducted empirical research that suggests that
people consider camera surveillance significantly less intrusive
when footage is destroyed after a short period of time rather than
permanently retained.132 Another proposal that might ensure a
meaningful connection between the special need and the search
itself is if there were a policy in place prohibiting review of the
footage except where an incident of domestic terrorism in fact
eventuated.133 Absent detailed evidence of the City’s body-worn
camera policy, however, it is difficult to predict how a court would
decide this particular question.
D. Conclusion to Part IV
In concluding our “reasonableness” discussion, and
remembering that this question will always entail value-based
judgments,134 it is worth highlighting the two competing policy
interests likely to dominate the court’s analysis. On the one hand,
not slim. . . . Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic
information raise grave concerns for individual liberty.”).
131
SLOBOGIN, supra note 32, at 129.
132 Id. at 111. (reporting on survey of 190 respondents asked to rate the
intrusiveness of various examples of camera surveillance).
133 See MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: EVIDENTIARY
BENEFITS AND PRIVACY THREATS 16 (2015)
Police may adopt a policy that their body-worn cameras will routinely
record their surroundings as they search, but that no one will preserve
or view this video footage unless a violent encounter or other basis for
a complaint has arisen shortly after the search. It is true that video
footage may capture images of items police do not have a right to
search, or allow for the possibility of a detailed analysis of items they
have a right to view during the search but not to seize. However this
may not raise Fourth Amendment problems if there are strict protocols
in place that prevent any government officials from ever viewing such
a video, except where an emergency has arisen, requiring this
evidence. (emphasis in original)
134 See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 38, at 52 (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment inquiry “must always be a value-based judgment”).
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courts have traditionally been reluctant to curtail law enforcement
efforts that are both non-discriminatory and effective at protecting
the public.135 On the other hand, the judiciary has recently been a
zealous protector of First Amendment interests.136 Absent the First
Amendment issues, it is likely that most courts would prioritize
public safety in the balancing exercise. This has been a common
criticism of the balancing test in anti-terrorism contexts: that the
risk of catastrophic consequences inevitably pushes the courts
towards limiting Fourth Amendment protections.137 Here,
however, it might be hoped that the potential First Amendment
“chill” would persuade the court to find a Fourth Amendment
violation.
V. Conclusion
The above analysis has been primarily descriptive, rather
than normative, in the hope of revealing just how far the Fourth
Amendment has been eroded by technological advancements and
the normalization of mass surveillance.138 The courts are not
135 See Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme
Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 38 (2002)
(describing the Court’s “barely constrained enthusiasm for the emergence of new
technologies and their inevitable use by law enforcers”).
136 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First
Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 917, 917 (2017) (reviewing Roberts Court case law
and asserting: “Recent years have witnessed an extraordinary expansion of the
First Amendment.”); Peter M. Shane, “The Expanding First Amendment” in an
Age of Free Speech Paradox, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 773 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme
Court in recent years has broadened the domain of communicative activity
covered by the First Amendment’s ‘speech’ protection and has limited in other
ways the capacity of government to regulate communication based on content.”).
137 See Simmons, supra note 62, at 897 (“[A]ntiterrorist searches are
particularly ill suited to a generalized balancing test . . . for the simple reason
that the gravity of the potential harm is so great that it overpowers any other
variable that could be placed into the balancing equation.”); Anthony C. Coveny,
When the Immovable Object Meets the Unstoppable Force: Search and Seizure in
the Age of Terrorism, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 329, 384 (2007) (“[W]henever a bright
line rule is replaced by a balancing test, civil liberties are likely to lose.”); see, e.g.,
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (“When the risk is the
jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property . . . the
danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted
in good faith . . . and with reasonable scope [and with advance notice].”).
138 See, e.g., Travis S. Triano, Note, Who Watches the Watchmen? Big
Brother’s Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDOZO L.
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unaware of this danger.139 This Comment has suggested that the
one hope for a check on this trend might be in contexts where
Fourth Amendment rights are coupled with First Amendment
interests. It is in these instances that the courts might be willing
to revivify the robust political protections that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to enforce.

REV. 389, 409 (2012) (stating that “being subject to a video recording is an
accepted fact of modern society”).
139 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (remarking on the “power
of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”).

